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INTRODUCTION
Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill’s brilliantly illustrated LAKEFRONT1 is
sure to win American legal history awards for its riveting history of the machinations
behind the preservation of the magnificent Chicago lakefront, now dominated by
public spaces. The authors weave together a compelling account of how the law
affected the development of the post-fire Chicago in the late 19th and 20th
centuries—largely made by lawyers and courts and only ratified by legislatures. The
book’s title suggests that the story is largely about the public trust doctrine (PTD).
But the doctrine is hardly the centerpiece of the authors’ story. What they have to
say about the doctrine is confined to the Illinois version of the PTD, and they do not
endeavor to explain where it deviates from the modern direction of the PTD.2
The book’s history of Chicago and its lakefront is groundbreaking legal
history, buttressed by twenty years of exhaustive research, colorful characters, and
interesting legal developments, of which the PTD played only a supporting role until
the 1970s. The principal lesson of their story, one the authors do not emphasize
enough, is a persistent struggle between public and private rights along the lakefront.
What is unusual is how long this struggle endured, beginning with Illinois Central
Railroad’s dominance in the late 19th century and the so-called “Lake Front Steal”
of 1869,3 in which the Illinois legislature conveyed roughly one thousand acres of
submerged Lake Michigan land to the railroad. The legislature soon thought better
of the giveaway, and its rescission in 1873 culminated in a famous 1892 Supreme
Court decision on the PTD, Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,4 pronounced as the
lodestar case of the doctrine by Professor Joe Sax a half-century ago.5
1.

See generally JOSEPH D. KEARNEY & THOMAS W. MERRILL, LAKEFRONT: PUBLIC TRUST
LAKEFRONT) (compiling numerous photos and
figures and two useful indices). The book builds on earlier articles by Kearney and Merrill: The Origins of
the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central,71 U. CHIC. L. REV. 799
(2004), and Private Rights in Public Lands: the Chicago Lakefront, Montgomery Ward, and the Public Dedication
Doctrine, 105 NW. L. REV. 1417 (2015). The authors provide a series of blog posts explaining the book at
the Volokh Conspiracy, which celebrates free markets. See Eugene Volokh, Dean Joseph Kearney & Prof.
Thomas Merrill Guest-Blogging About "Lakefront: Public Trust and Private Rights in Chicago" (June 14, 2021,
10:38 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2021/06/14/dean-joseph-kearney-prof-thomas-merrill-guestblogging-about-lakefront-public-trust-and-private-rights-in-chicago/.

AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CHICAGO (2021) (hereinafter

2.
See, e.g., MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTIANA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (3d ed. 2021).
3.
4.
passim.

The authors’ chapter 1 is entitled “The Lake Front Steal.” LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 8.
Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 387 (1892), discussed in LAKEFRONT, supra note 1,

5.
See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 489 (1970); see also Michael C. Blumm & Zachery A. Schwartz, The
Public Trust Doctrine Fifty Years After Sax and Some Thoughts on Its Future, 44 PUBLIC LAND & RES. L. REV.
1 (2021) (tracing Sax’s considerable influence). Without an attempt to deconstruct the Sax article, the
book claims that it was about providing fora in which the public interest against public resources giveaways
could be expressed, and those fora were supplied by federal legislation like the Clean Water and National
Environmental Policy Acts. LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 275. Overlooked is Illinois Central’s proscription
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The authors discuss the controversy over the lakebed conveyance and the
Court’s pathbreaking decision, but they view the effect of the PTD on the Chicago
lakefront as less significant than other considerations like the public dedication
doctrine, which nearby landowners invoked to restrict development of the lakefront
and preserve their views of the lake.6 Still, the Illinois Central Court focused public
attention on what was an attempt to create a monopoly of the lake’s outer harbor,
and that attention has persisted for a century-and-a-quarter following the Court’s
decision. Today, the Chicago lakefront is largely public, the consequence of several
factors that LAKEFRONT explains. This struggle between public and private rights
over the Chicago lakefront existed long before the dawn of the modern
environmental movement a half-century ago, influenced not only by the Court’s
surprising 1892 decision but also by the persistent oversight of neighboring
landowners protecting their views of the lake. This public-private clash, in which
private rights were subject to both public and neighboring landowner challenges,
created the glorious Chicago waterfront of today.
This review of the Kearney and Merrill book focuses on the public trust
doctrine, as articulated in the Lake Front case that culminated in the Illinois Central
Court’s decision. There is more to the book, mostly centering on local Chicago
interest, so this review concentrates on the public trust. Though in the book’s title,
the authors maintain that the PTD was not as central to the story of the lakefront’s
preservation as other influences.7 They remain public trust skeptics.

I. THE CONTROVERSIAL CONVEYANCE
The Lake Front Case involving Illinois Central Railroad might be the
PTD’s lodestar, but it came a half-century after the U.S. Supreme Court ratified the
PTD in a case involving oyster harvesting in New Jersey’s Raritan River.8 The
authors do not attempt to explain this history, confining the earlier cases to
footnotes.9 Nor do they examine in any detail the remarkable expansion of public
against “substantial impairment” of trust resources, a substantive requirement beyond supplying
procedural fora. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
6.

LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 85-127 (discussing the public dedication doctrine).

7.

LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 306.

8.
Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842) (upholding the reasoning of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in an earlier oyster harvesting case in the Raritan River); Arnold v. Mundy, 6
N.J.L. 1 (1821); see BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW, AND
ECOLOGY IN NEW JERSEY HISTORY (2d ed. 1998). The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision, which the
U.S. Supreme Court considered to be persuasive in Martin, 41 U.S. at 417-18, relied heavily on Sir
Matthew Hale’s treatise, De Jure Maris (first published in 1787 but written over a hundred years before),
which traced the English origin of public rights in navigable waters to the Magna Carta, Mundy, 6 N.J.L.
at 90-91. On Hale’s influence, unmentioned in LAKEFRONT, see Michael C. Blumm & Courtney Engel,
Proprietary and Sovereign Public Trust Obligations: From Justinian and Hale to Lamprey and Oswego Lake, 43
VT. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (2018).
9.
LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 319-20 n.94. The authors do cite a recent article exploring the
Roman history of the PTD. Id. (citing J.B. Ruhl & Thomas McGinn, The Roman Public Trust Doctrine:
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rights that took place in the late 19th century from tidal waters (the so-called English
rule) to include navigable-in-fact waters, reflecting the advent of steam power on the
country’s great inland waterways, like the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers (the so-called
American rule).10 The Supreme Court had approved this expansion in the scope of
public rights to include navigable-in-fact waters years before its decision in the Lake
Front case.11
With no explanation of the 19th century’s rapidly expanding law of public
rights in waterbodies, the book’s discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision makes
Justice Field’s decision appear to be more idiosyncratic than it was. The book
inaccurately claims that the Court “adopted” the PTD in the decision upholding the
Illinois legislature’s revocation of the railroad grant.12 Actually, the Court had
adopted the public rights underlying doctrine a half-century before, although without
naming it as “the public trust doctrine”.13 What the Court did in its 1892 decision
was to expand the doctrine from a public ownership principle, protecting public
access to waterbodies for navigation and fishing, to a nonalienation rule, restricting
public conveyances to private parties like the Illinois Central Railroad.
The book’s discussion of the long-running controversy over the Chicago
Harbor is detailed, illuminating, and will forever affect the interpretation of the
events that preserved the Chicago Harbor mostly for public uses. The authors explain
Illinois Central’s domination of the waterfront beginning with an 1852 city ordinance
enacted over the objections of Michigan Avenue property owners, whose opposition
to lakefront development would prove steadfast and become an essential component
of the public lakefront that still exists 170 years later.14

What Was It, and Does It Support an Atmospheric Trust, 47 ECOLOGY L.Q. 117 (2020)). But they make no
attempt to explain the Lake Front Case in light of the expanding scope of public rights that 19th century
American courts had recognized before the Lake Front Case, infra note 10.
10. The authors claim that in cases before its Illinois Central decision, Illinois courts had decided
that the state had adopted the so-called “English rule” of public ownership of the beds of navigable waters,
which confined public rights to tidal waters. See LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 16. But in Barney v. Keokuk,
94 U.S. (2 Wall.) 389 (1877), fifteen years before its Lake Front decision, the Court invoked admiralty
jurisdiction to uphold public rights in inland, nontidal waters. LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 74. The book
does not mention Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851), which overruled The
Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825), and announced that federal admiralty
jurisdiction was not limited to tidal waters. See Blumm & Engel, supra note 8, at 12-13.
11.

See cases cited supra note 10.

12.

LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 31.

13.

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

14. LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 12 (noting that the 1852 ordinance was enacted over a mayoral
veto). Also in 1852, a prominent landowner, Senator Stephen A. Douglas, granted the railroad a right-ofway over riparian land he owned in south Chicago, reserving “all title, right, and ownership to the land
and water” to “the Centre of Lake Michigan.” Id. at 308-09 n.21. According to one account, Douglas got
rich off sales to the railroad he championed in Congress, suggesting that he acted out of self-interest:
There was no northern Illinois to speak of. Chicago virtually did not exist until the
1850s, when it boomed because of the Illinois Central Railroad, which was created
by Stephen A. Douglas through an act of Congress. He became very wealthy as a
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The railroad’s wish to expand in the post-Civil War era confronted the
uncertainty over the ownership of the Lake Michigan lakebed. According to the
authors, confusion over whether the lakebed was owned by the state, the federal
government, or upland riparian landowners hindered the railroad’s expansion plans.15
Between the 1869 legislation and the Supreme Court’s 1892 decision, the ownership
question would be resolved in favor of state ownership before the Lake Front case
was even filed.16
Local opposition to the railroad’s development of the shoreland led it to
seek approval from the state legislature. The ensuing lobbying—which the authors
acknowledge included a fair amount of corruption and several close votes in the
Illinois Senate17—led to the enactment of the 1869 statute, which passed over the
governor’s veto and conveyed roughly one thousand acres of Lake Michigan lakebed
to the railroad, and was labeled by opponents as “the Lakefront Steal.”18 The
governor’s veto might have been influenced by a couple of prescient newspaper
articles adumbrating the nonalienation rule that the Supreme Court would eventually
adopt a quarter-century later.19

result because he owned all the right-of-way real estate along Lake Michigan in
Chicago that he sold to the IllinoisCentral.
ScottHorton,Lincoln’sParty,HARPER’SMAGAZINE(Aug.5,2016),http://harpers.org/2016/08/lincolnsparty/ (quoting Sidney Blumenthal, author of the Lincoln biography A SELF-MADE MAN (2016)).
15. LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 20-23 (explaining the controversy over the proposed sale of north
Lake Park in 1867 to the railroad to site a passenger depot. The opponents claimed the parkland was or
should be inalienable, as the lakefront “ought to be held forever sacred as the property in trust for the
enjoyment and use of all conditions and classes of people of poor, as well as rich, among our people”); see
infra note 19 and accompanying text.
16.

See cases discussed in supra note 8.

17. The authors conclude that vote-buying in the Illinois legislature was commonplace, and that
the evidence “clearly leans” in favor of Illinois Central’s using “corrupt means” to secure passage of the
Lake Front Act. LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 34-36; see also id. at 29 (discussing the close Senate votes).
18. LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 8. Although Chapter 1 of the book is entitled “The Lakefront
Steal,” the authors largely reject this label; see also id. at 28 fig.1.7 (depicting a notice of a “Great Mass
Meeting” at Farwell Hall on Feb. 17, 1869 concerning the “The Great Swindle”). The authors suggest
that the railroad primarily exercised its “corrupt means” in order to protect its existing investments in
lakefront properties, not to secure future profits from control over the outer harbor; therefore, Justice
Field’s later characterization of it as “grasping plutocratic corporation” was inaccurate because “fear is a
more powerful motive than greed.” LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 32. They also argue that the 1869 grant
did not give the railroad monopoly control over Chicago harbor, as it did not displace existing harbor
facilities in the Chicago River, and they maintain that the widespread assumption about the limited role
of government at the time meant that “perhaps most of those voting for the Lake Front Act sincerely
perceived it to be in the public interest.” Id. at 33. There is also the matter of the fact that one provision
of the Lake Front Act promised a 7% gross receipts tax on developments from expanded railroad operators,
providing revenue to fund downstate development projects that attracted downstate votes, whose support
prevailed over the local opposition. Id. at 33-34 (characterizing the vote on the statute as “a fight between
Chicago and downstate interests . . . won by the latter”).
19. See LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 29 (recounting articles in the Chicago Tribune and Chicago
Republican that argued for state ownership of the Lake Michigan lakebed and water and maintained that

Winter 2022

The Public Trust and the Chicago Lakefront

321

The enactment of the Lake Front Act hardly ended the dispute over the
lakefront. Litigation ensued, first instigated by Cyrus McCormick, the inventor of
the mechanical reaper and founder of International Harvester, who was a Michigan
Avenue resident. McCormick was soon joined by the U.S. Attorney, who claimed,
without much foundation, that the railroad could not construct a new depot in north
Lake Park because the federal government either owned the land or was a trustee of
an 1852 dedication that the land be forever free of buildings, apparently due to the
city’s ordinance permitting operation of the railroad.20
District Judge Thomas Drummond enjoined the railroad from constructing
a passenger depot in August 1869, ruling that the parkland was subject to a common
law dedication, enforceable by the federal government.21 The railroad chose not to
appeal Drummond’s decision and, as a result, never built the depot.22 The authors
suggest that this blocked shoreland development caused the railroad to shift attention
to developing the lakebed that it secured in the 1869 Lake Front Act.23 Lakebed
development would require the railroad to defend the validity of the 1869
conveyance, which was under question by the Illinois legislature, and which
introduced an 1871 bill to repeal the 1869 Act.
The same year, the U.S. Attorney filed another suit, this time challenging
the railroad’s proposed filling of the outer harbor as interfering with navigation
without federal consent.24 An ensuing settlement would establish that the federal
government could set harbor lines protecting public navigation, which the authors
maintain effectively curtailed the original grant of roughly one-thousand acres to just
a “modest curtilage around the railroad’s existing improvements.”25 A persistent
the alienation of either would be inconsistent with state sovereignty). On the governor’s veto, see id. at
30.
20. See id. at 36-37. This dedication was a condition of the city’s grant of permission to the railroad
to operate within the city limits. Id. at 37. In 1850, the federal government granted about 2.5 million acres
to the state for a railroad running from the southern tip of the state to Chicago and beyond (the authors
provide a useful map in figure 1.2). See id. at 10-11. A year later, the state-chartered Illinois Central
Railroad and reconveyed the federal land grant to the railroad, but conditioned its operation within
municipalities on local consent. Id. at 10. In 1852, Chicago gave permission to the railroad—over a mayoral
veto, prompted by the opposition of Michigan Avenue residents. Id. at 12. That ordinance purported to
give the railroad the right to fill the lake for its operations, which the authors suggest was of uncertain
legal validity. Id. The ordinance also included a railroad promise to build a breakwater to protect the city
and its residents from flooding, and importantly, a promise to the Michigan Avenue residents that no
buildings and improvements east of Lake Park would block their views of the lake. Id. at 12-13.
21. Id. at 37 (noting that Judge Drummond held that the dedication was based on common law,
not a statutory dedication under Illinois law).
22.

Id.

23.

Id. at 38.

24. Id. at 39. The federal government would settle this case in 1872, with the railroad consenting
to the federal government establishing harbor lines beyond which the railroad could not obstruct
navigation, and which, according to the authors, “severely restrict[ed] its ability to engage in further
construction of harbor facilities without the consent of the federal government.” Id.
25.

Id. at 44.
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theme throughout the book is an effort to reduce the stakes involved in the Supreme
Court’s affirmance of the state’s legislative revocation of the Lake Front Act.26 Much
ado about relatively little seems to be the idea.

II. THE CONTEXT
Intervening was the Great Chicago Fire in October 1871. It decimated most
of the downtown area, nearly one-third of the city’s residences, including the Illinois
Central Railroad passenger depot.27 In the wake of the fire, the city decided to dump
the resulting debris and fill in the lake between Lake Park and the breakwater that
Illinois Central built under the 1869 Act.28 The fills would begin the transformation
of the lakefront.
The Illinois legislature proceeded to revoke the 1869 grant in 1873 in the
wake of the fire and amid an economic depression, for which the legislators were
looking for scapegoats. The authors suggest that the motive for the repeal was to
punish the railroad for its “presumed venality” in getting the 1869 legislation
passed.29 The railroad defended on the ground that it possessed “vested rights” under
the 1869 Act.30 But a populist, anti-railroad sentiment—newspapers alleged that the
Senate vote on the repeal depended upon how many of its lawyers were paid by the
railroads—overcame that argument.31 The authors consider the repeal to be “largely
symbolic legislation[,] a rebuke of railroads.”32 Perhaps it was also a reflection of the
growing political power of the Granger movement.33
The railroad challenged the 1873 repeal, but not immediately because it was
preoccupied with rebuilding after the fire and with combatting the effects of the

26. Id. (discussing, for example, a so-called “dock-line settlement” with the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, in which the railroad agreed to abide by the Corps’ harbor lines to protect navigation; the
authors conclude that the settlement “greatly reduced the scope of the rights conferred by the Lake Front
Act” to the effect that the “Lake Front Act was now but a shadow of what it had seemed in 1869”).
27.

Id. at 41-42.

28.

Id. at 41. The authors observe that “[i]t did not occur to anyone to ask the state’s permission.”

29.

Id. at 45.

30.

Id. at 45–46.

Id.

31. Id. at 46-47 (explaining that the House vote on the repeal was 127-5, but the Senate vote was
closer, 31-11, and that the railroad likely made cash payments to legislators).
32. Id. at 48 (noting that the public resented railroads for charging high rates “and [their] generally
high-handed behavior,” and observing that the repeal legislation did nothing to produce the public goods
the Lake Front Act promised: an outer harbor, a new depot, and more parkland).
33. The populist Granger movement scored a big win in the Supreme Court in 1877, when the
Court upheld the ability of state railroad commissions to regulate railroad rates and service, a revolutionary
development in public rights. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to
Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, in PERSPECTIVES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (1971).
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economic depression that began in 1873 and persisted until the end of the 1870s.34
Then, in 1880, the railroad began “an aggressive expansion campaign” that included
constructing large wharves north of Lake Park to facilitate unloading timber from
the booming lumber industry in Wisconsin and Michigan, a kind of “less grandiose”
outer harbor than envisioned in the 1869 Act.35 But in 1881, when the railroad began
filling one hundred feet of the lakebed to expand its tracks in Lake Park, the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers objected, and eventually the Secretary of War, Robert
Todd Lincoln, the assassinated president’s son, rejected the filling in 1882.36 The
result focused the railroad’s attention on developing its outer harbor rights under the
repealed Lake Front Act. But in 1883, its efforts were challenged by the state in what
would become the Lake Front Case.
The state filed suit against the railroad, the city, and the federal
government, claiming that it owned the submerged land of Lake Michigan, and that
the Illinois legislature’s repeal of the 1869 grant was effective.37 The city claimed that
as the riparian owner of Lake Park, it controlled development in the harbor.38 The
railroad, which removed the case to federal court, maintained that the 1869 Act
validly transferred to it vested rights that the state could not repeal and that the
railroad now owned the lakebed and controlled the harbor.39 Thus began what was
then called the “greatest case ever tried in Illinois.”40

III.THE CASE
The Lake Front Case, like just about everything else involving the Chicago
waterfront, was not straightforward. The federal government initially refused to
appear, even though urged to do so by adjacent Michigan and Prairie Avenue
landowners—and by the time the federal government acceded, four years had gone
by, and it was too late for federal attorneys to participate in the trial and oral

34. LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 48–49 (noting that the 1869 judicial injunction against
development in north Lake Park caused the railroad to build its passenger depot outside of the park).
35. Id. at 50. These wharves, or piers, extended 800 feet beyond the dock-line, but were approved
by both the Corps of Engineers and the city. The state was not consulted. Id. at 51.
36. See id. at 52 (explaining that the railroad’s right-of-way, granted in 1852 by the city, supra note
20, was for a width of 300 feet, but it had only used 200 feet). Secretary Lincoln rejected a board of
inquiry’s recommendation that the Corps approve the landfilling and extend it to include more piers
because he thought it would exceed the government’s authority and assumed that the railroad owned the
lakebed, a matter in dispute. Id. at 53.
37.

Id. at 54.

38. Id. at 55 (arguing for the so-called “English rule” of submerged land ownership, which was
about to be resoundingly rejected by the Supreme Court). See supra note 10.
39. Id. at 54-55. The authors explain that the removal to federal court almost certainly would not
be granted today. Id. at 316 n.37.
40.

Id. at 54 (so-labeled by the authors).
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argument.41 The trial began in 1887, presided over by Justice John Marshall Harlan,
riding circuit, along with Judge Henry Blodgett, although evidence was taken for
nearly two months by a master in chancery court.42 Illinois Central emphasized the
significant improvements it had made in reliance on its Lake Front Act grant and the
severe congestion in the harbor due to increasing traffic.43 Oral argument consumed
eight days.44
Justice Harlan’s 1888 decision concluded that the state owned the lakebed;
the city (not the federal government) owned Lake Park, including its filled lands;
and the railroad could keep all its lakefront improvements.45 The federal government,
Harlan determined, had no property rights in Lake Park, having conveyed to the city
all its rights.46 The result rejected the reasoning underlying the 1869 injunction
against the city’s plans to sell the northern portion of Lake Park to the railroad for a
passenger depot,47 although the federal government did retain regulatory rights over
Lake Michigan navigation.48 The authors consider the court’s declaration that the
city’s ownership of Lake Park included lakebed fills to be based on dubious grounds;
since the basis of the railroad’s right to improvements was grounded on riparian
ownership and language in its state charter.49
Harlan’s opinion examined in some detail the issue of whether the
legislature could revoke the 1869 grant. He distinguished between the alleged
existing shoreland rights the statute confirmed in the railroad and the lakebed acres
of the outer harbor. The former were vested and constitutionally protected, but not
the latter because Harlan concluded that the statute gave the railroad only
discretionary authority to construct the outer harbor, and the railroad had not done
so before the legislative revocation of 1873.50 He also concluded the railroad’s request
that the city return the money the railroad had paid for building its planned passenger
depot in Lake Park was evidence that the grant was revocable.51
41. Id. The authors list several prominent lawyers involved, including former Senator Lyman
Trumbull, representing Illinois Central, and Melville Fuller, soon to be appointed Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, for the city. Id. at 55.
42.

See id.

43.

Id.

44.

Id. (July 5-13, 1887).

45.

Id. at 55-57.

46.

Id. at 57.

47.

See text accompanying supra note 22.

48.

LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 57.

49. Id. at 57-58. The city’s lakebed filling was justified on grounds that its charter authorized
construction of a breakwater (even though the railroad constructed it), but it said nothing about filling the
lakebed. Id. The railroad’s riparian rights included the right to wharf out. Id.
50. Id. at 58 (quoting Harlan to the effect that the railroad had only a revocable “license,” a
conclusion he reached despite, as the authors point out, language in the 1869 act that conveyed the harbor
to the railroad in “fee”).
51.

Id. at 58–59.
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Harlan’s decision ratified the status quo of existing possessory rights, what
the authors’ claim was an exercise in “pragmatic accommodation.”52 By recognizing
the railroad’s rights to all its improvements, the decision gave the railroad much of
what it wanted, including what the authors’ claim is de facto control of the outer
harbor due to aggressive recent developments. But two-and-a-half years after
Harlan’s decision, the railroad decided to appeal.53

IV.THE APPEAL
While the appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, the 400th
anniversary of Christopher Columbus’ “discovery” was about to be celebrated, and
Congress selected Chicago as the site for the World Columbian Exposition.54 The
siting of the fair at what was to become Jackson Park, seven miles south of the city,
instead of at Lake Park in the city center, involved protracted negotiations among
the parties to the Lake Front case, particularly about how to transport what turned
out to be nearly nine million passengers to and from Jackson Park, the details of
which will not be recounted here.55 One consequence of those negotiations was to ask
for and receive Supreme Court acceptance of an expedited hearing in the pending
Lake Front Case, although the Court’s decision came too late to be consequential in
terms of transportation planning for the fair.56
A Court of only seven justices held three days of oral argument in October
57
1892. Justice Stephen J. Field—the longest-serving justice of the 19th century—

52.

Id. at 59. The authors describe this status quo as
[t]he railroad got to keep all its track, terminals, yards, wharves, and piers, over
which it had active control. All it lost was future development rights. The city got
to keep all of Lake Park, over which it episodically exercised control. All it lost was
the power to oust the railroad from the lakefront. The federal government got to
keep its breakwater and to continue to exercise a veto power over new facilities in
the harbor. All it lost was its abstract claim to north Lake Park, over which it had
long ago relinquished control. The only party given nothing but abstract rights was
the state, which was declared to be the owner of the submerged land—over which
it had never exercised effective control.

Id.
53. Id. (noting that the railroad’s lawyers thought its vested rights argument would be well
received by the Supreme Court).
54.

Id.

55. The authors explain the negotiations over the world’s fair at some length, which eventually
produced agreements on steamer piers and viaducts to get passengers to and from the fair. See id. at 59–
72. The railroad proceeded to build a new passenger depot, Central Station, south of Lake Park, which
was finished just weeks before the fair opened, enabling the railroad to profit handsomely from the tencent tickets it sold. Id. at 71–72.
56.

Id. at 72.

57. Chief Justice Fuller did not participate, since he had been counsel to the city in the case. See
supra note 41. Justice Blatchford, who was a stockholder in Illinois Central, also recused. Id. at 73. The

326

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 11:2

wrote the opinion for a divided 4-3 Court.58 He ratified the lower court’s decision
on state lakebed ownership, announcing that the lakebeds of the Great Lakes were
similar to tidal submerged lands, which the Court had long recognized as stateowned.59
Field also agreed with Harlan that the railroad’s existing developments
(some on filled land) were vested in light of state and city approvals.60 But he
disagreed with Harlan’s interpretation that the outer harbor grant was a revocable
license until developed.61 Instead, Field decided that the grant was inherently
revocable, developed or not, because the state’s title was held in trust for the public
for navigation, fishing, and commerce purposes.62 This was “a title different in
character from that which the State holds in lands intended for sale.”63 The idea that
title to submerged Lake Michigan land was held by the state in trust for the public
was, the authors note, a position that had been mentioned in the press in 1869—
perhaps this opposition influenced the governor’s earlier veto of the Lake Front Act,
and the city briefed the claim of public ownership in the Lake Front case.64 Public
ownership of land submerged beneath navigable waters was actually a fairly wellestablished proposition by 1892.65
The authors observe that formulating public ownership as a trust was
reflective of Field’s “deep[] suspicio[ns] of legislatively conferred special privileges
and monopolies.”66 Field characterized Illinois Central as a “corporation created for
one purpose, the construction and operation of a railroad between designated points,
is, by the [1869] act, converted into a corporation to manage and practically control

participation of Justice Harlan, who was reviewing his own circuit court decision, “passed without
question.” Id. at 74.
58. Justice Field, appointed by President Lincoln in 1863, served until 1897, a record length until
broken by Justice William O. Douglas in 1975.
59. LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 74. This result was predictable based on the Court’s reasoning in
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1877), in which it recognized state ownership of submerged inland waters.
See supra note 10.
60.

Id. at 74.

61.

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

62.

LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 76.

63.

Id. (quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892)).

64. Id. The state had made the trust argument before Justice Harlan in the circuit court case, and
city made the argument in its briefs to the Supreme Court. Id. at 319-20 n.94 (citing Arnold v. Mundy, 6
N.J.L. 1, 10 (1821) and Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842)); see also supra notes 15 and 19 and
accompanying text (describing earlier trust arguments).
65.

See cases cited supra note 10.

66.

LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 76.
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the harbor of Chicago . . . for its own profit generally.”67 This antimonopoly
sentiment animates public trust jurisprudence to this day.68
The authors do not subscribe to Field’s theory of the railroad as a
monopolist, describing the railroad’s efforts leading up to the 1869 act as defensive,
attempting to ward off other competitors seeking access to the lakefront.69 But
monopolists fear just such competition. That fear does not make them nonmonopolistic.
LAKEFRONT quotes the famous line of the Supreme Court’s opinion that
the state of Illinois could no more abdicate the public trust in property in which “the
whole people are interested” like the Chicago harbor than it could renounce its police
power, but they quickly note that Justice Field could cite no authority for the
proposition.70 They make no attempt to assess the implications on sovereign
authority from the parallel Field saw between the police power and the public trust.
A logical conclusion would be that both the police power and the public trust are
inherent in sovereignty, the former an affirmative power, the latter a limitation.
Several courts have ruled that the public trust is indeed an inherent limit on
sovereignty.71 The authors do not see the public trust in this light.
Field’s anti-monopolistic concerns led to his holding that the 1869 grant
was beyond the Illinois legislature’s authority,72 although smaller grants, that do not
substantially impair remaining trust properties, or which serve trust purposes, are
permissible.73 The grant was, consequently, “if not absolutely void on its face . . .
67.

Id. (quoting Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 451).

68. See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen Moses, The Public Trust as an Antimonopoly Doctrine,
44 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 1 (2017).
69.

LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 77 (quoting Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453)..

70. Id. Justice Field stated: “The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
whole people are interested, like navigable waters and the soils underneath them, so as to leave them
entirely under the use and control of private parties . . . than it can abdicate its police powers . . . .” Id.
71. See, e.g., Mineral Cnty v. Lyon Cnty, 473 P.3d 418, 425 (Nev. 2020) (public trust “derives
from inherent limitations on a state’s sovereign powers”); Robinson Twp v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901,
947 (Pa. 2013) (public trust provision in the state constitution created no new rights but enumerated preexisting rights of such “‘general, great and essential’ quality as to be ensconced as ‘inviolate’”); Ariz. Center
for L. in the Pub. Int. v. Hassel, 837 P.2d 158, 168 (Ariz. App. 1991) (public trust is “an inabrogable
attribute of statehood itself”); Esplande Props. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It
is beyond cavil that ‘a public trust has always existed in Washington,’” only “partially encapsulated in the
language of [Washington’s] constitution . . . .”) (citing Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (Wash.
1987) and Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1993)).
72. LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 77 (“A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a State
has never been adjudged to be within the legislative power.”) (quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387, 453 (1892)).
73. The authors do not include Field’s language concerning the exceptions to the nonalienation
rule, but it is worth quoting here: “The control of the state for purposes of the trust can never be lost,
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of
without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.” Illinois
Central, 146 U.S. at 453. The book does suggest that there is a distinction between “small, commercepromoting grants of submerged land, needed for wharves, docks, and piers, and large monopolistic grants
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subject to revocation.”74 The Court also upheld the city’s title to Lake Park, even as
expanded by filling, against claims by the railroad and the state, due to the city’s
riparian right to wharf out.75
A three-member dissent, in an opinion authored by Justice George Shiras,
did not challenge the majority’s view of the PTD but would have ruled that the 1873
revocation was an “unconstitutional interference with vested rights," requiring
payment of just compensation to the railroad.76 Shiras also questioned the ripeness
of the case. He would also have waited “to invoke the doctrine of the inviolability of
public rights when and if the railroad company shall attempt to disregard them.”77
But the majority found the grant of the outer harbor invalid, and the railroad’s
motion for reconsideration failed twice.78

V. THE RESULT
Thirty-three years after the Lake Front Act, nineteen years of litigation
ended with the Court essentially grandfathering all of Illinois Central’s
developments but preserving public control over future development. The authors
recognize the Lake Front Case as “one of the most important cases about property
rights in American law.”79 That is true for the PTD that the Court recognized, for it
interjected some public balance into an overwhelming privatized system of property
rights.
But the authors’ discussion of the case seems halting and truncated. They
use adjectives like “nebulous” and “blunderbuss” to describe the PTD, and explain in
some great detail that the preservation of the public lakefront in the wake of the Lake
Front case and into the 20th century, at least until 1970, was due not to the public
trust but to the public dedication doctrine.80 The public dedication doctrine was
of submerged land, which could be used arbitrarily to restrict the public’s access for navigation and
fishing.” LAKEFRONT , supra note 1, at 77.
74. Id. The distinction between void on its face and voidable could be significant if the latter
required revocation by the state.
75.

Id. at 78.

76.

Id. at 78-79.

77.

Id. at 79 (quoting Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 474 (Shiras, J., dissenting)).

78. Id. The Court did not address the federal issues in the Lake Front case because the federal
government did not join in the expedited appeal. But in 1894, the Court rejected the notion that the
federal government retained rights in Lake Park, and therefore lacked standing to enforce any limitations,
although the Court suggested that the Michigan Avenue landowners had standing because they purchased
in reliance on the adjacent public dedication of the parkland. The effect of the latter ruling would spawn
considerable litigation over construction of building in Lake Park, soon to be renamed as Grant Park. See
id. at 79-80. In 1902, the Supreme Court affirmed lower court decisions that that the railroad’s existing
piers and wharves did not extend beyond “practical navigability,” thus upholding Illinois Central’s existing
improvements. Any future developments, however, would require public approval. See id. at 80.
79.

Id. at 81.

80.

See id. at 83-127.
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enforced by wealthy Michigan Avenue property owners like the mail-order retailer
Aaron Montgomery Ward.81 That assessment is no doubt true as to the Chicago
lakefront. But the PTD that the Lake Front Case helped formulate is the most
notable reason for its characterization as an important decision over a century-andquarter later. Consequently, the book’s persistent attempt to diminish the doctrine
seems incongruous given the title of the book and may undermine an otherwise
exceptionally important contribution to urban legal history.82

VI.THE LEGACY
The authors’ apparent ideological antipathy for the PTD seems to lie in the
uncertainty it interjects into the overwhelmingly private rights ordering of American
property law, which they seem to think unwise.83 They explain the resurrection of
the PTD three-quarters of a century after the Lake Front Case, coinciding with the
nascent environmental law movement of the early 1970s, and they point to Professor
Sax’s arguments as especially influential.84 So they were.85 But the authors complain
that the PTD had a haphazard effect on the lakefront, allowing Northwestern
University to expand by filling the lake, while disallowing Loyola University from
doing virtually the same thing a few years later.86 Similarly, the PTD was not
offended by construction of a public middle school in Washington Park or the
renovation of Soldier Field in Burnham Park, but disallowed the expansion of the
U.S. Steelworks by a planned filling of nearly 200 acres of Lake Michigan.87 And
while George Lucas was dissuaded from pursuing his museum on the lakefront, the
Obama Foundation is proceeding with its proposed library.88 The authors emphasize
81. Ward, referred to as the “watchdog of the lakefront,” where his store on Michigan Avenue
store was situated, had an outsized influence keeping the lakefront free of buildings through a long series
of lawsuits. See id. at 95-117.
82. The book’s contribution to the history of Chicago includes chapters on the filling and private
development of “Streeterville,” now home to the campus of Northwestern’s Pritzker School of Law; the
reversal of the Chicago River over the objections of the state of Missouri, affirmed by the Supreme Court
in Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); and the extension of Lake Shore Drive both north and south.
See LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 128-243.
83. Merrill’s casebook on property law is one of the leading treatments of the subject. See THOMAS
W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (3d ed. 2017).
84. See LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 263–68. The authors discuss Sax’s article, supra note 5, and
its effect on decisions like Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm’n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970) (allowing a
school in Washington Park as consistent with the PTD), and People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 360
N.E.2d 773 (Ill. 1976) (rejecting a statute approving the grant of 194 acres of lakebed to U.S. Steel to
expand its South Works steel mill as inconsistent with the PTD). LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 263–68.
The book is quite critical of the latter decision, complaining about the PTD “theory” as a source of
authority, since the court did not tie the PTD to the state’s constitution. See id. at 268-69.
85.

See generally Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 5.

86.

LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 274.

87.

Id. at 266.

88.

Id. at 292.

330

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 11:2

the uncertainty and the apparent random nature of these results.89 The inference is
that the variability in outcomes is undesirable because it undermines property rights,
a frequent claim of PTD critics.90
Yet recognition of the existence of substantial, if uncertain public rights in
the midst of an overwhelmingly private property rights system infused a kind of
pluralism into the Chicago lakefront that created a substantially different lakefront
that would have been created by an exclusively private rights system. The authors
overlook the important role played by the PTD in moderating the private rights
system: requiring a kind of accommodation between public and private rights.91
Instead, they criticize the application of the PTD for not producing consistent
results. But property doctrine often produces such results. Consider nuisance law,
prescriptive easements, riparian rights, or takings law, none of which produce results
that are particularly predictable.92
The authors also emphasize that, under the Illinois PTD, court
interpretations are subject to override by the state legislature.93 That might be the
law of Illinois, but a substantial number of jurisdictions consider the PTD to be
inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not subject to legislative repeal.94 The Lake
Front decision at the center of the book clearly equated the PTD with the inalienable
state police power.95 A logical interpretation of the Supreme Court’s interpretation
would be that, like the police power, the public trust is inherent in sovereignty. The
89.

Id. at 297.

90. Among the most prominent of these critics is my friend and former dean, Jim Huffman. See,
e.g, James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE
ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2007) (claiming that the PTD’s Roman and English roots are mythical, a claim
refuted at least in part by Ruhl & McGinn’s article, see supra note 9); James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of
Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENV’T L. 527 (1989) (claiming that the
PTD is inconsistent with a constitutional democracy, although a number of courts have disagreed); see,
e.g., John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 45 ENV’T L. 263 (2015); Kacy
Manahan, The Constitutional Public Trust Doctrine, 49 ENV’T L. 463 (2019); see also cases cited in supra note
71.
91. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The Accommodation
Principle, 27 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 649 (2010).
92. See. e.g., Michael C. Blumm, A Dozen Landmark Nuisance Cases and Their Environmental
Significance, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 403, 407-08, 444 (2020) (explaining the flexibility of nuisance law, in
particular the rise of reasonableness criterion at the heart of nuisance doctrine in the 20th century, giving
courts broad authority to decisions about alleged nuisances and to fashion nuisance remedies base on
“balancing of the equities”); John A. Lovett, Restating the Law of Prescriptive Easements, 104 MARQ. L. REV.
939 (2021) (examining the split among jurisdictions as to whether an unexplained use is presumed to be
adverse to the owner and advocating for a hybrid approach to the issue); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Scope
of Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.01(a) (Amy K. Kelley, ed., 3d ed. 2022)
(discussing the uncertainties in the scope of riparian water rights); Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S.
Ct. 2063, 2077-78 (2021) (expanding considerably the scope of “permanent physical occupations” that are
per se takings of property rights).
93.

LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 245.

94.

See supra note 71.

95.

See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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book instead endorses legislative override,96 although curiously the authors seem to
regret the Illinois legislature’s override of the public dedication doctrine that the
authors believe was central to the public preservation of the lakefront.97
Any discussion of the PTD and Professor Sax’s article should have
mentioned its significant influence internationally.98 The authors do not. The reader
is left with the sense that the doctrine was an idiosyncratic interpretation of an odd
decision that actually had very little real effect on the modern Chicago lakefront.
Actually, the Lake Front Case and Professor Sax have had enormous influence
throughout the world.99 But there is no mention of this legacy in LAKEFRONT.

CONCLUSION
LAKEFRONT is an engrossing read, at least as legal analyses go, and will
prove to be an enduring contribution to urban legal history. But its effort to diminish
the effect of the PTD is misguided. The book not only largely misses the long history
of the PTD before the Lake Front case that evolved out of Roman and English law,100
it also seems surprised at the doctrine’s recent success in preserving the Chicago
lakefront.101 The book does therapeutically link the doctrine to Justice Field’s
Jacksonian antimonopoly views,102 and it points out that the fills that make up the
Chicago lakefront today were persistently upheld by the courts.103
Yet the book lacks any discussion of the adverse environmental effects of
the fills on the Lake Michigan ecology; the assumption seems to be that the fills were
costless. Ignoring these environmental effects of lake fills makes the book seem
anachronistic. Part of the PTD’s aim is to protect public trust resources against

96. LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 298. This affinity for legislative control of the PTD conflicts
with the notion that the doctrine is inherent in sovereignty. See cases cited in supra note 71. It also is
inconsistent with the Illinois Central Court’s rejection the vested rights of the railroad, since if the
legislature could create vested rights in Chicago Harbor, it “would place every harbor in the country at
the mercy of a majority of the legislature of the state in which the harbor is situated.” Illinois Cent. R.R.
v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892).
97.

See LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 126-67, 283-87.

98. For a discussion on the expansion of the PTD internationally, see Michael C. Blumm & Rachel
D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law, and Constitutional Approaches to
Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741 (2012) (discussing the PTD in India, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, Ecuador, and Canada).
99.

See id.

100. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
101. LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 291-98 (discussing litigation over proposed fills by U.S. Steel
and Loyola University and the use of parkland by the proposed Lucas museum).
102. Id. at 76 (noting Field’s antipathy to what he perceived to be “a powerful and privileged
corporation”); see supra text accompanying note 67.
103. Id. at 55-57, 73-78, 81-82 (upholding the fills of the railroad prior to the Illinois Central
decision). The only structure that the courts required removed was the National League champion Chicago
White Stockings stadium in Lake Front Park, as inconsistent with the public dedication doctrine. Id. at
92-94
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“substantial impairment” of trust resources.104 Despite the mention of public trust in
its title, LAKEFRONT makes no attempt to explain what “substantial impairment” of
trust resources demanded by the PTD actually is. In discussing the failed proposal
to fill lakebed to expand U.S. Steel’s South Works, the authors discuss the Illinois
Supreme Court decision without giving any consideration to the environmental
effects of filling 194 acres of lakebed.105 Similarly, explaining the effect the so-called
“boundary-line” agreements that effectively ratified numerous illegal lakebed fills,
the authors suggest that the “cost was barely a hundred acres of lakebed, a tiny
fraction of the area of the vast lake.”106 This cavalier dismissal of environmental
externalities is a major oversight.107
As a case study of the development of Chicago, LAKEFRONT may be
unmatched. It should be featured in Chicago bookstores as history at its best: a great
story about the triumph of public rights in preventing monopolization and producing
an unmatched waterfront. But the title of the book is misleading; it may be about
public rights, but the authors’ cramped view of the PTD hardly deserves the title
page.108 And its halting treatment of the PTD undermines the legal value of
LAKEFRONT, despite its considerable historic value.

104. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892); see supra note 73.
105. The authors instead emphasize the “scant evidence” that the filling would interfere with on
navigation, commerce, and fishing, and the lack of deference the court gave to the Illinois legislature’s
approval of the conveyance in 1963. LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 266-67.
106. Id. at 242.
107. Another oversight is the failure to emphasize the parallel between the public trust’s migration
from submerged lands to upland parklands in the 20th century, as reflected in cases like Paepcke v. Pub.
Bldg. Comm’n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970) (LAKEFRONT, supra note 1, at 260-66) or the Lucas
Museum project, id. at 291-98, to the earlier, dramatic expansion in public rights in inland navigable waters
in the 19th century, see supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. The Illinois parkland trust cases have been
prominent among cases, including from other jurisdictions, which have divorced the public trust from
waterbodies. See BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 2, ch. 8.
The exhumation of the Lake Front case by Professor Sax has, over the past quarter-century, also led
to a surprisingly international revolution in public trust doctrine in places as diverse as India, Pakistan,
Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Colombia, Ecuador, and the Philippines. See id. ch. 11. The book makes no
mention of the significance of these developments.
108. Perhaps the opportunity to insert a reference to a doctrine opposed by private property
interests was too irresistible in terms of promoting book sales. At any rate, readers expecting the book to
show how the 19th century Lake Front case, energized by Professor Sax, has become a powerful force in
both domestic and international law, are likely to be disappointed by the book’s jaundiced view of the
public trust.

